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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a styl ized model of pre t r ial settlement negot ia­
t ions in a personal-inj ury case. It is.assumed that the prospective 
plaint iff  knows the severity  of his  injury but that the prospect ive 
defen<lant has incomplete informat ion . As a resu l t  of this information 
asymmetry a proport ion of s l ightly-injured plaint i f f s  are tempted to 
inf late their settlement demands and a proport ion of such demands are 
rejec ted by susp ic ious defendan t s .  B y  analogy with other models of  
adverse selection ( e . g . ,  Rothschild-St iglitz (1976)) , the  presence of
slightly-injured plain t i f f s  imposes a nega t ive externality on plaintiffs  
with  genuine severe injuries s ince defendant s  cannot identify the 
severely-injured and somet imes rej ect their reasonabl e  demands ,  forcing 
them into costly l i tiga t ion . A f il ing fee imposed on minor claims is 
shown to d isplace the equ ilibrium but ,  paradoxicall y ,  to cause an increase 
in the frequency of  l i t igation.  
This model differs f rom recent contributions to  the l iterature on 
pret r ial negot ia t ions under incomplete informa t ion . Unlike P'ng (1983) 
and Bebchuk (1983) , the uninformed litigant in this model learns from the
observed equi l ibrium behavior of the informed lit igant . Unlike Ordover­
Rub instein (1983) and Salant-Rest (1982) ,  settlement demands are
endogenous .  
I. Introduction 
It is often argued that if some bargain exists that all participants 
strictly prefer to a specified outcome, then surely that specified outcome 
will not occur. Coase (1960) m akes such an argument in his analysis of 
bargaining over externalities. Gould (1973) and Shavell (1982) invoke 
the same line of reasoning in their analyses of pre-trial settlements. 
And yet there are many occasions when outcomes do occur that are Pareto 
inefficient--or at least that are revealed to be, ex post. For example 
peace (resp. labor) negotiations collapse and wars (resp. strikes) ensue 
which each side subsequently recognizes to be more costly than some settle­
ment would have been. Trading on a futures contract terminates without 
full off sets and the shorts must incur transport costs to deliver physical 
goods--and the longs must likewise incur costs to reship these goods to the 
cash market--when both sides would have been better off with some paper 
settlement prior to the close of futures trading. As Arrow (1979, p. 25) 
has pointed out in discussing the Coase theorem, the argument that 
rational bargainers will alwavs reach some Pareto efficient agreement 
depends on the implicit--and often unrealistic--assumption that they have 
complete information. If, instead, information is private, a negotiator 
may well reject a Pareto-dominant proposal because a rational inference 
from his limited information leads him to infer that some alternative-­
which is in fact Pareto-dominated--is the more attractive option. 
Situations where it is common knowledge that private information exists 
are characterized on the one hand by bluffing, deception, and concealment 
and on the other by discovery, challenging, and attempted inference. In 
such circumstances, an offer by one side or a response by the other often 
becomes the basis for a revision of beliefs about the strength of the 
opponent's position. 
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Below a legal conflict is examined in which self-interested adversaries 
have incomplete information. Agents in the model are assumed to be rational 
but not clairvoyant. In particular, an accident occurs and the severity of 
the prospective plaintiff's injury is not known with certainty to the pro­
spective defendant. It is assumed that--for each possible severity of 
injury--there exists an out-of-court settlement which both parties would 
prefer to trial. But since each prospective plaintiff knows that his adver­
sary has incomplete information about the extent of his injuries, in equilbrium 
some plaintiffs find it in their interest to inflate their claims--that 
is, to demand more than any defendant would be willing to pay if he had 
complete information about their injuries. Prospective defendants are, 
of course, painfully aware of their limited information and know that 
some plaintiffs exploit defendants' ignorance by making inflated claims. 
As a result, in equilibrium a defendant facing a high demand may well 
reject it in the rational (albeit possibly incorrect) expectation that 
the particular plaintiff he is challenging is making an inflated claim. 
The probability that a case goes to trial is determined endogenously in 
our model. 
Representation of the legal settlement process as a noncooperative 
game of incomplete information helps clarify why out-of-court settlements 
sometimes fail to occur. In addition, such theorizing has practical value. 
Periodically, proposals are made to alter legal procedures (discovery rules, 
filing fees, and so fort�). For any such change, it is desirable to deter­
mine its consequences--hefore the "reform" is implemented. But such pro­
cedural changes sometimes have important effects on the behavior of the 
legal adversaries. Without a behavioral model of how legal adversaries 
interact, there is no way to make a sensible prediction about how behaviors 
will be affected when--as is often the case--the procedural change has 
1w pr'"·edent. Mode ls 1 ike the one developed here permit predict ions 
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of the behavioral responses which would be induced by a proposed change 
in legal procedures. The predictions are based on the plausible (yet test­
able) premise that legal adversaries act as if in a self-interested manner. 
The analysis below may usefully be distinguished from independent 
work by Bebchuk (1983) and P'ng (1983). Each considers legal negotia-
tions as a game where learning can occur. Each builds upon earlier models 
which investigate the financial incentives to litigate, such as the models 
of Landes (1971), Gould (1973), Posner (1977), Landes and Posner (1979), 
Shavell (1982), and Cooter et al. (1982). 
Bebchuk (1983) considers a game of incomplete information in which a 
plaintiff makes some real-valued settlement demand on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. The defendant then either settles or goes to trial. In these 
respects his model is identical to ours. However, in the application of 
interest to Bebchuk, the defendant--not the plaintiff--has the private 
information. Since it is the uninformed player who moves first, nothing 
can be learned from his settlement demand. 
P'ng (1983) considers a game of incomplete information in which a 
plaintiff makes an exogenous settlement demand on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. The defendant either settles or rejects the demand. If he rejects 
it, the plaintiff has the opportunity to withdraw the suit or proceed to 
trial. P'ng, like Bebchuk, assumes that the defendant has private inform­
ation. Since the plaintiff moves (for the second time) after the defendant, 
the plaintiff can in principle learn from the prior move of the informed 
player. However, because P'ng arbitrarily restricts his players to pure 
strategies, the resulting restricted equilibria involve pure pooling and 
the uninformed player cannot infer anything about the defendant's 
information by observing his prior move. 
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In contrast to either of these papers, inference and misinference, 
honesty and deception are central to our model. The paper proceeds as 
follows. In the next section, we formulate the legal-settlements game 
which will be analyzed and discuss the solution concept which will be 
used. In Section III, the model is solved and the equilibrium strategies 
are calculated in an intuitive manner. Section IV illustrates how the 
model can be used to predict the consequences of exogenous changes in 
legal procedures. In Section I through IV, it is assumed that plaintiffs 
are of two possible types (slightly-injured and severely-injured). 
Section V indicates aspects of the analysis which carry over to the n-type 
case. 
II. Formulation of the Legal Settlements Game 
We examine the following stylized situation. One person causes an automobile 
accident in which a second party is injured. Although both parties observe 
the circumstances of the accident, only the injured party knows accurately the 
extent of his own injuries. To be sure, the motorist who is at fault knows 
generally that-- in accidents of this kind--there is some probability (p1) that 
the injury to the other party is slight (s1) and complementary probability (p2) 
that the injury is severe (s2). But he does not know which outcome actually 
occurred in this instance. 
After a short time, the injured party files a settlement demand which 
the potential defendant can either accept or reject. If he accepts, he avoids 
the costs of mounting a legal defense in court. If he rejects the demand, the 
case goes to trial. The outcome of the trial is assumed to depend only on the 
circumstance� of tl1e accident and the true injury sustained--not on the magni-
tude of the rejected settlement demand. 
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If  the case goes to trial and the plaintiff is in fact slightly-injured 
( resp . severe ly-inj ured ) , his ne t expected payoff from the t rial--after 
deducting lawyer ' s  cos ts--is w1 ( resp . w2 > W1) .  In such circumstances, the
expected cos t to the defendant--inclusive of legal fees--is v1 ( resp . v2 > v1). 
I f  the case is set tled out of court , the costs the defendant incurs 
depend only on the magnitude of the demand he accepts. If the plaintif f 
made a settlement demand which cost the defendant d--inclusive of lawyer ' s  
cos ts--then the net payoff t o  the plaintiff (af ter deduc ting his costs)  is 
denoted g (d ) , where g ' ( d )  > 0 and g (d)  � d. 
Wi , Vi' pi' and g (•) are exogenous. Given these exogenous factor s ,  our
goal is to characterize the settlements demanded by potentia l  plaintiff s  of 
each type and their acceptance or rej ection by potential defendants. In 
characterizing these outcomes ,  we assume that the strategies selec ted by 
each player form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is , each player ' s  
strategy is optimal given correct conjectures about the strategies of the 
other players and ful l use of his informa tion. For the defendant faced 
with a particular settlement demand,  this means that--in evaluating his 
expected cost of challenging a plaintif f of unknown type at trial--he uses 
Bayes '  theorem to revise his prior beliefs concerning the severity of the 
plaintif f ' s  injury in light of his knowledge (based on the given equilibrium 
strategies of each type of p l aintif f )  of the relative likelihood that each 
type of plaintiff would make the demand he observes. 
Def ine Fi (x) to be the probabilit y that a plaintiff of type i makes a
set tlement demand which would cost the defendant less than or equal to x to 
accept. Let a (d)  be the p robability that the defendant would accept a demand 
costing him d. The th ree functions--F1 ( x ) ,  F2 (x) , and a (d ) --cons titute the
s trategies of the players. 
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In a Nash equilibrium, a plaintiff of type i is assumed to take the 
defendan t ' s  strategy as given and to select Fi (x)  to  maximize his expected
reward . Hence , given a (•) , Fi ( x) must satisfy the following inequality :
��O ! a (x) g (x) + ( 1 - a ( x) )wi j dFi (x) :: �::o la(x) g (x ) + (1 - a ( x) ) wi ( dFi (x)
for i = 1 , 2 where F . (x)  is any feasible s trategy the plaintiff  might choose . l/1 
The defendant is assumed to select his rule ( a(d) ) for responding to observed 
demands so as to minimize his expected costs ( inclusive of legal fees ) .  
That is , a ( d )  must satisfy the following inequality given d ,  Fi (x) , and
Pi (i =l , 2) :  
a ( d ) d  + (1 - a(d)) � P r ( s . l d )V .i=l 1 1
2 
� a ( d ) d  + ( 1 - &(<l)) l: P r ( si I d ) V ii=l 
where a (d) is any f easible strategy the defendant might choose. Pr ( s .  I d )  is1 
computed by revising pi according to Bayes' theorem--given the defendant ' s
observation of d and his knowledge of the s trategies of each type of plaintiff 
( Fi (x) ) .
Our formulation encompasses both pure and mixed strategies. For examp l e ,  
if  a plaint iff of type i wished always to make a demand d ,  then this pure 
strategy could be represented as follows : 




x < d 
x :: d. 
Similarly , if the defendant wished always to accept some set of demands (A)
and to rej ect every other demand,  then this pure s trategy could be represented 
as follows : 





Pure strategies arise in equilibrium whenever a single strategy for each 
player stands out as superior given the strategies of  the other players, Mixed 
strategies ar ise in equilibrium only when several strategies � as best  for 
some player given the strategies of the other players. In the latter situat ion , 
pursuit  of self-interest leads every player with a set of t ied best  strategies 
to select from within the set; but self-interested behavior does not 
insure that every individual player will select the � strategy f rom this 
set, I ndeed , equilibrium may r equire that spe c i f ic proport ions of  such players 
select particular s trateg ies from the set of  t ied alternatives. 
Suppose , for example , that defendants faced with a demand costing d to 
settle determine--given Fi (x) --that taking a plaintiff to court would l ike-
wise be expected to  cost d, In the absence of  any f inancial incentive e ither 
way ,  a particular defendant might wel l  elect always to settle ( o r ,  alterna-
t ively , always to l i tigate) .  But it should hardly be surprising i f --of the 
many defendants who are indifferent when faced with d--some would  choose to 
accept it while others would choose to r ej ect i t. Our analysis suggest s ,  
however , that what is  indeterminate a t  the individual level can b e  determined 
at the aggregate level�/ For , unless  a certain proportion of  the ind i f fe rent
individual def endants accep ted demand d ,  f inancial incent ives would lead 
pla intiffs  to depart from the given behaviors. Equilibrium analysis  thus 
leads us to predict  the proportion of  defendants faced with equally  pre-
ferred alternatives who make a par ticular choice. Below, we interpret a (d)  
to mean that--of all the defendants faced with demand d--a would accept it  
while ( 1 - a) would rej ect it.  
S imilarly , suppose plaintiffs  of type i are indifferent among a set  of 
alternative demands. In the absence of any f inancial incentive one way or 
the othe r ,  a particular plain tiff  of  type i might always favor one element 
in this set of t ied al ternatives. But it should not be surprising i f--of 
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the many t ype-i plaintiffs  who are indifferent--some would make one demand 
while  some would make another. However, what is indeterminate at the 
individual level can again be determined at the aggregate level. Unless 
a certain proportion of the indifferent type-i plainti f f s  selec ted specific 
settlement demands , f inancial incent ives would lead defendant s  to depart 
from the g iven behavior. Equilibrium analysis thus leads us to predict the 
proportion of t ype i plaint i f fs who would make a particular demand when 
f ac ed with equally attractive alte rnat ives. Below, we interpret Fi (x) to
mean that--of all type-i plaint i f f s  in the population--Fi would make demands
costing less than (or equal to)  x while 1 - Fi would make demands cost ing
more than x. 
The equilibrium problem we have posed may appear formidable. However ,  
the reader will soon learn that i t s  solution i s  straightforward. In the 
next sec t ion,  we f irst characterize the broad features of the equilibrium 
in four intuit ive propositions. We then solve explicitly for the equilibrium 
strategy of each player. 
I I I. Determining the Equilibrium S trategies of the Game 
We begin by  establishing some of the properties of any equilibrium of 
our settlement s  game. We assume throughout that if  the defendant had com-
plete informat ion about the plaint i ff ' s  type , then these adversaries could 
always reach a settlement which both would strictly prefer to trial, More 
formally , it is assumed that g (Vi ) > Wi for i = 1 , 2. At trial , against a
type-i plain t i f f , the defendant would pay Vi and the plaintiff  would receive 
Wi' I f ,  instead , a settlement was reached which again cost the defendant Vi, 
the defendant would be equally well o f f  and--by the foregoing assumption--
the plain t i f f  would be stric t ly bet ter o f f. I f  a slight ly lower settlement 
were reached , both sides would be stric tly better off than at trial. Under 
this assumption,  trials would � occur if defendants had complete inform-
at ion about the severity of the inj ury of the prospective plaintiff.  Instead 
.1 s1·ll l<'ll11'nt preferred to trial by both parties would result. If defendnnl · 
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have incomplete informat ion, we will show that settlements sometimes 
fail to occur and the adversaries instead sometimes proceed to trial . 
For s imp l ic ity, we assume that defendants au toma t ically rej ect demands 
exceeding v2 since se t t l ing such high demands costs more than going to
tr ial no matter how severely the plaintiff  is inj ured. The dispo sition of 
demands no larger than v2 will of course depend on the stra tegy adopt ed in 
equilibrium by defendants. 
We f irst state and prove four propositions which par t ially c harac terize 
the equ il ibr ia of our model : 
Proposi tion 1: There is z ero probabil ity that  set tlement demands o f  less 
than v1 will be made by either plain t iff .
Proof:  Suppose, on the con trary, tha t in equilibr ium some plain t if f  made 
settlement demands with posit ive probabil ity which are str ictly l ess than 
v1. Faced with any such demand, a def endant wou ld always acc ept it despite
his unc er tain ty about the  type of plaint iff  he  faces since in  e ither case 
he would be worse off making a court challenge [ if d < v1, then d < m in (V1, v2); 
hence a(d) = l].  Under this c ircumstance, any plain t i f f  making such demands 
with posit ive probabil ity is not behaving opt imally since he can increase h is 
expected payof f by instead focussing that  same probabil ity on settlement 
demands marginally c loser to v1 •
Proposit ion 2: Demands exceeding v2 will n ever b e  made by a slightly­
injured pla intiff  with pos i t ive probability and will only be made by a 
severely-inj ured plain t i f f  with positive probab il ity if there is zero 
probab il ity of reaching a settlemen t he would f ind more rewarding than 
tr ial . 
Proo f :  B y  assumpt ion, all demands exceeding v2 are automat ically rej ected .
H ence , a slightly-inj ured plain t iff  would be bet ter off instead demanding 
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v1 with the same probab il ity ( s ince g (V1 ) > w1 ) .  A severely-inj ured
pla intiff  would demand more than v2 with posit ive probabil ity only i f
-1a ( d) = 0 for g (W2) < d .::: v2; if there were� p roba b il ity a demand in
th.is interval would be accepted, the severely-injured plain t i f f  would 
prefer taking this chance to the certainty of rej ect ion that would  accom-
pany a demand exceeding v2• 
Proposi t ion 3 :  Whenever the slightly-injured plain t if f  makes two dist inct
settlement demands with positive probability in  equilibrium, the severely-
inj ured plaintiff  must str ictly prefer the higher demand. Whenever the 
severely-injured plaintiff  makes two distinct set tlement demands with 
positive probabil ity in equil ibrium, the slightly-injured pla in t i f f  must 
str ictly prefer the lower demand (provided the h igher demand is  accept ed 
with positive probabil ity) . Consequently, none of the following situat ions 
can occur in equ il ibrium : 
(a)  Each plaintiff  assigns positive probability to the same n (>l) 
demand levels; 
( b )  Hoth plaintiffs assign positive densi ty to a common interval; 
( c )  The sligh t ly-inj ured plaintiff  (resp. the severely- inj ured 
plainti f f )  assigns positive density to some interval and the 
severely-injured plaintiff  (resp. the sl ichtly-inj ured plain-
t i f f )  assigns probability mass to any point in that interval 
except its upP.er boundary (resp. its lower boundary ) .  
Proof: If the sl ightly- injured plaintiff  makes two dist inct demands with 
posit ive probabil ity in equ il ibrium, each must be accepted with positive 
probab ility; otherwise the plainti f f  would strictly prefer settlement at 
v1 (since g ( V1) > w1) .  Moreover, the higher demand must be accepted with
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strictly smaller probability than the lower demand; otherwise he would 
never make the lower demand. For the slightly-inj ured plaintiff t o  
make both demands with positive probab ility ,  he must in addition expect 
the same payof f  from either choice: 
a (dt}g ( d£) + ( 1 - a (dt) )W1 ; a (dh
}g ( dh) + (1 - a (dh
}) W1
where d£ and dh denote , respec tively , the lower and higher demands .
Since a(d£) > a ( dh) and w2 > wl , it follows that
a(dt) g ( d£} + ( 1 - a (dt�) W2 < a (dh
}g ( dh) + (1 - a (dh) )W2•
Hence, the severely-inj ured plaintif f would strictly prefer the higher 
demand as was asserted in the first half of Proposition 3. 
The second half of Proposition 3 can be proved by a parallel argument
showing that if the two demands result in equal expec ted payoffs  to the 
severely-inj ured plaintiff then--provided a (d
t
) > a (dh) --the expected
payo ff  to the slightly-inj ured plaintif f from making the lower demand 
must be larger . The parenthet ical qualification in the statement of the 
second half of the proposition is necessary to cover cases where the 
severely-injured plaintiff makes two demands with posi tive probability 
which are both always rej ec ted (a (d
£
) ; a (dh) ; O) ; in such cases,  each
plaintif f would be indif ferent be tween the two demands . 
To establish consequence (a) , note that if each plaintif f made the 
same pair of demands with positive probability then the severely-inj ured 
plaintiff would have to be indif ferent be tween two demands which yield 
equal expec ted payo ffs to the slightly-inj ured plaintif f. But , as we 
have shown , the severely-injured plai ntiff would always stric tly 
pref er the higher demand . To establish con sequences (b) and (c ) ,  
first note that any plaintif f who assigns positive density to an 
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interval would obtain an unchanged expected payoff i f  instead he divided 
the same probability mass between discre te points in that interval .  This 
fact can be used to "sweep" density assigned to an interval into mass 
points at levels suitably chosen so that Proposition 3 can be applied. ·-�/
Proposition 4: The strat eg ies of  the two types of plaint iffs must never 
perm it a def endant who observes a settlement demand in (V1 , v2) and who
knows the equ il ibr ium strateg ies to inf er with probability one which type 
of  pla in t iff  is making the observed demand. Consequently,  neither of the 
following situat ions can occur in equil ibrium: 
( a )  One plaintiff assigns positive mass t o  a demand in (V1 , v2)
whi le the other pla intiff  assigns no mass to that demand.  
(b )  One p laintiff assigns positive density to  an  interval (containing 
values in (V1, v2 ) )  while the other plaintif f assigns zero density
to that interval. 
Proof: Suppose,  g iven the strateg ies of each type of plaintiff  and 
conf ronted by a demand above v1 , that  the def endant could infer
with  probabil ity one that  the plaintiff  is slightly inj ured. Such an 
inf erence woul d  be valid, for example,  if the slightly-inj ured pla in-
t if f  were the only plain t i f f  who made the observed demand with positive 
proba b il ity or , alterna t ively,  if he alone assigned posit ive density to an 
interval conta ining the observed demand . Given the def endant ' s  inference, 
he would always rej ect the o bserved demand, But since the slightly- injured 
pla in t i f f  strictly pref ers settl emen t  at v1 to trial ( g ( V1) > w1 ) ,  the
hypothesized strategy would not then be optimal for the slightly-injured 
pla in tif f .  Consequently, such a strategy would not occur in equ il ibr ium. 
Suppose , given the stra tegies of each type of plaintif f  and confronted 
by a demand in (V1 , V2) ,  that  the defendant could infer with probability
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one tha t  the pla in t if f  is severely-inj ur ed . Such an inf erence would be 
val id ,  for example ,  if  the severely- injured plain t if f  were the only pla in-
t if f  who made the observed demand with posit ive probabil ity or , alternat ivel y ,  
i f  h e  alone ass igned pos it ive density to an interva l conta in ing the observed 
demand . Given his inference , the defendant would always accept the observed 
demand . I t  follows that the slightly-injured plaint i f f  would never make a 
lower demand . Assuming tha t  t he def endant's inf er ence is val id , we can con-
elude tha t  the sl ightly-inj ured pla in t if f  mus t  a s s ign probability one to 
demands higher t han the one observed . In par t icula r ,  if the severely-inj u r ed 
plain t i f f  assigned pos i t ive dens ity to an int erval contain ing the observed 
demand , the sl ightly-inj ured pla in tiff  would have  to a s s ign proba b il ity one 
to demands at or above the upper boundary of this int erval . I f , alterna t ively , 
the severely-injured pla in t i f f  ass igned po s i t ive  mass  to the observed d emand , 
the sl ightly- inju r ed pla in t i f f  would have to make h igher demands with  pro-
bab i l ity one .  The argument s  used to establ ish Propo s i t ion 3, however , rule 
out either of these pos s ib il it ies .�/ Henc e ,  the hypothes ized s itua t ion canno t
occur in equ il�br ium . 
These four propo sit ions severely restr ic t the comb inat ions o f  strateg ies 
(a(·) , F1 (·) , F2 (·) ) which n eed to be exam ined to determine the set of  Nash
equ ilibria .  Proposit ion 1 impl ies tha t  F1 and F2 are z ero for d < v1 .
Proposit ions 3 and 4 imply  tha t nei ther F1 nor F2 can have pos it ive slope
for any d E ( V1 , v2 ) ;  in tha t  interval , both d istribu t ion func t ions are s t ep­
func t ions . Furt hermo r e ,  Propositions 1 and 4 impl y tha t  each distribu t ion 
func t ion can have a t  mo st one jump in ( V1 , v2 ) ;  f ur thermore,  they imply
tha t  if one distribut ion func t ion j umps somewhere in (V1 , v2) ,  the o ther
mus t  jump at the same po in t .  Finally, Propo s i t ion 2 impl ies that 
-1 F1 ( V2 ) ; 1 and tha t  either F2 (v2 ) ; 1 or r1 ( d )  ; 0 for  d > g (W2 ) .  There
rema in ten qual itat ively d is t inct  types of s itua t ions which might occur as 
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Nash equi l ibr ia . Figure 1 dist inguishes these equilibria by the locat ion 
of the j umps in each d is t r ibut ion func t ion . A j ump in the ith d istr ibut ion
func t ion a t  po int d means that the ith pla in t i f f  makes demand d with
positive probabil ity . 
[Figure 1 goes here . ]  
o Elimination o f  Implausible Nash Equilibria Suppor ted b y  Dominated
Strategies
The requirement that the strategies s e lected by players in a game form 
a Nash equilibrium is weak and ,  unfortunately , it does not rule out all 
implausible combinations o f  strategies . To e l iminate the unsa t isfac t ory 
equi l ibria which remain , various refinement s  of the Nash s olut ion have 
been suggesteri .  Nash equilibria supported b y  dominated strategies seem 
particularly imp lausib le . Hence , various refinements which have been 
p roposed ( t rembling-hand perfectness , propernes s ,  and so forth) exclude 
such equilibria .  
A strategy o f  player i is said to be  " dominated" if  play e r  i has avail-
able an alternative strategy which is  never inferior--no mat t e r  what the other 
players do--and is superior against some combination ( s )  of strategies which 
the other players  have available . The argument that no player would ever 
choose a dominated strategy seems compelling.  Choosing a dominated rather 
than an undominated strategy involves taking unnecessary risks--an increase 
in the payof f  is never achieved and a strict  dec rease in the payof f  can occur 
i f  the othe r players happen to select particular combinations of strategies 
available to them . The Nash rest riction by itself does not e l iminate such 
situations as long as--in the proposed equilibrium--the other players never 
choose any of the combinat ions of strat egies wh ich cause player i's 
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dominated s trategy to yield a payoff which is strictly lower than his 
alt ernat ive s tra tegy would yield .  Be low , we follow the wide spread prac-
t ice of s trengthening the Nash restrict ion by adding the res triction 
that the s trategies the players select be undominated .  This add it ional 
restric t ion suffices to eliminate cases d-i. 
Consider f irst cases f-h .  In each case, severely- injured plain t i f f s  
some t imes make demands which are s o  high ( exceeding v2 ) that the ir rej ec-
t ion is inevitable . Such a strategy is dominated by a s trategy of always 
making d emands in the interval ( g-
1
(w2) ,  v2J .  Instead of insuring a trial, 
the la t ter s trategy provides the same payof f if the demand is rej ected and 
a higher payof f  if the demand is accepted)_/ Under such circums tances ,  i t  
seems implaus ible that a severely- injured plain tiff would ever demand more 
than v2 . 
Consider next cases i and j .  In each case , severely-inj ured plaint i f f s  
some t ime s make demands (g-
1
(W2 ) )  which are so  low that the settlement they
would receive is equal to the payof f  expected at trial. For this to occur 
in equilibrium, every demand s trictly preferred to trial (d > g-1(w2) )  mus t  
b e  rej ected . Hm,,ever , auy d emand in (g-1 (w2), v2J weakly domina tes a 
demand of g -\w2) since the same payof f  occurs if it is rej ected and a 
higher payof f  occurs if it is accepted .  
Finally, consider cases d and e .  In e i ther case , severely- inj ured plain-
t i f f s  some t imes demand an amoun t ( V2) which--un<ler complete informati on-­
would leave the defendant indif feren t be tween settling and going to trial. 
For such cases to be equilibria , it is impossible for all demands cost ing 
VL to be accepted; othe rwi se, slightly-injured plaint i f fs would never
demand le s s .  Hence , in principle , ei ther � v2 demands are accepted or 
all are rej ected . But all such demands cannot be rejected in a Nash equi-
li brium since severely-injured plaintiffs are indifferent between 
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demand ing v2 and pooling with the slightly-inj ured plaintiff at a demand 
accepted with pos i t ive probab ility in the interval ( g-
1
( W2 ) ,  v2..P.
1 Hence 
in cases d and e, de fendants mus t  accept some v2 demand s .  However, such a 
s tra tegy is dominated by another s trategy available to the def endant--the 
rej ect ion of  all v2 demands. If the plaint i f f  making the v2 demand is in 
f act severely-inj ured, then this alternative strategy results in the 
�cost to the defendant as an out-of -court se ttlement . If, however , 
the plain t i f f  is slightly inj ured, the alternative s trategy results in a 
lower cos t  to the defendant. Under these circumst ances, it seems implaus ible 
tha t  a defendant would ever s e t tle a demand costing v2 . 
The Nash equilibria in the remaining cases (a-c) can each be supported 
by undominated strategies . The separating equilibrium (case c) requires 
that every slightly-injured plaintiff demand v1, every severely-injured 
-1 plaintiff demand v2, and every demand exceeding g (W2) be rejected . It 
can be verified that--for any set of exogenous parameters--the separating 
equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the other equilibria which remain. The 
three poss ible types of Nash equ ilibria in undomina ted strategies (a-c) 
can be classif  ie<l as follows : 
Case a :  "Pure pooling" equilibri a ,  in whi ch all slightly-inj ured 
plain t i f f s  make the same set tlement demand as the severely-
inj ured plaintiffs; 
Case b: "Semi-pooling" equilibria ,  in which� sl ightly- injured plain-
t i ffs  make the same set tlement demand (d2 > v1) as all 
severely-injured plaint i f fs while the rema inder of the slightly-
injured plaint iffs demand v1; and 
Case c :  " Separat ing" equilibrium, i n  which all slightly- injured plainti f f s  
demand v1 and get i t  while all severely-injured plaintiffs demand 
v2 and wind up in court. 
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We now fully characterize these e quilibria.  We begin with semi-pooling 
equilibria and then find the separating equilibrium and the pure pooling 
equilibria to be limi ting case s .  For any set of exogenous parame ters , 
t;1ere will exis t a continuum of equilibria paramet erized bv ct - 2" 
As we will discuss later , the mult iplicity of equilibria in our game arises
 
because of the as sumed range of set tlements which both defendants and 
severely-inj u red plaintiffs would f ind preferable to trial given comple te
information . 
o Characteriz ing Each Type of Equilibrium
In any semi-pooling equilibrium, slightly-injured plaintiffs mus t  be
indifferent between making a demand which cos t s  v1 and making a demand which 
costs  d2; moreover, each of these alternatives mus t  be at leas t weakly pre­
ferred to any othe r real-valued demand.  S imilarly, in any semi-pooling 
equilibrium, severely-injured plaint iffs mus t  at least weakly prefer to make 
a demand cost ing d2 to any other real-valued demand. These condit ions place 
res t rictions on a ( d) . 
Le t a1 (d) be the acceptance funct ion which would make a slightly-inj ured 
plaintiff indifferent between demanding v1 and demanding any higher amount 
d .  Le t a2 (d) be the acceptance funct ion which would make a seve rely- injured 
plaint iff indiffe rent between demanding d2--which a slightly-injured plain-
tiff ranks equal with v1--and demanding any othe r  amount d. That is , 
a1 (d) solves g (V1 ) = a1 ( d ) g ( d) + ( 1 - a1 (d) ) w1 and a2 (d)  solves
a1 (d2) g ( d2) + (
1 - a1 ( d2) ) W2 = a2 ( d ) g ( d) + ( 1 - a2 ( d ) ) Wi. 




g ( Vl) - Wl 
g (d) - w1 
a1 (d2) g (d2) + ( 1 - a1 ( d2) ) W2 - w2
a2 (d)  = g ( d )  - w2 
(g ( d2 ) al ( d2) g (d )
I t  is easy to  verify that:ll 
i. a1 ( V1) = 1 
{ > u2 ( dl for d > d2 
a1 (d)  = a2 (d) d = d 2 
< a2 (d) d < d 2 
i i .  
and iii. ' -1 ai ( d )  > 0 and ai (d) < 0 for d > g ( Wi) and i = 
1, 2.
�)-w2 
We plot a1 ( d )  and a2 (d) in Figure 
2. Each function is positive and 
s t r ictly decreasing . a1 (d)  ( resp.  a2 (d) ) approaches zero asymptot ically 
as d approaches infini ty and approaches infinity asymptotically as d 
-1 -1 approaches g ( W1 ) (resp . g (W2) ) . The convex curvature of the
functions plotted in the diagram is merely illu s t rat ive and will not be 
used in the analysis . It is useful to  think of a1 (d) as an indifference 
� ind icating the locus of a - d combinations which the sli&htly-inj ured 
plaint iff would find as desirable as the a - d combination ( 1 , v1) .  
S imilarly , a2 ( d) can be regarded as an ind ifference curve indicating the 
locus of a d combinations which the severely-injured plaint iff would find 
as desi rable as the a - d combin at ion (a1 (d2 ) ,  d2) .
Define a ( d )  as follows: 
a(d) > 0 for all d ,  with e quali ty at d v2 
a ( d )  = 1 for d:::. v1, and 
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a ( d) �min (a1( d), az( d)) with equality i f f  d = v1 or d = d2. 
By as sumption , a ( d) = 0 f o r  d > Vz. 
-1 Clearly , a (d)E [ O , l ]  i f  dz> g (Wz).
Hence for dz in this region , a ( d) is a feas ible s t rategy for defendants. 
We now verify that--if defendants adopt a ( d) as their s t rategy--
plaintiffs will find semi-pooling behavior to be optimal. Cons ide r  
Figure Z. In the diagram, a(d) lies below the heavily shaded curve, 
min ( a1( d), az(d)), touching it only twice--at d = v1 and d =dz. 
Given a ( d ), a slightly-injured plain t i f f  is indi f ferent between v1 and 
d2 and strictly prefers eithe r demand to any other while the severely­
inj ure d  plaintiff st rictly pref e rs dz to any other demand. Hence, given 
a(d) eithe r type of plain tiff would strictly reduce his payo f f  if he were 
to change his s t rategy unilaterally .ii./ 
[ Figure Z goes here . ]  
Next, consider the behavior o f  defendants, In any s emi-pooling equili-
brium , they must accept the common demand (dz) with a probability which 
is positive but less than one . For if they always accepted such demands, 
no slightly-injured plaintif f  would ever demand v1; and if they� 
accepted dz demand s ,  every slight ly-injured plain tiff would prefer to 
make a demand cost ing v1• 
S ince in a semi-pooling equilibrium , every severely-inj ured plaintiff 
makes a demand costing le ss than v 2, defendants would s t r i c tly prefer to 
accept all such demands were it not for the fac t that some sligh tly-inj ured 
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plaintif fs also make them. Indeed, for defendants to be indifferent 
between settling at a cost of  dz and challenging a plaintiff of unknown 
type at t rial , there mus t be "just enough" slightly-inj ured plain tif f s  
infla ting the i r  claims to make a court challenge equally at trac tive a s  
a de fense tac tic. Let n l, Z denote the frac tion of the slightly-injured
plaintif fs who make a demand cos ting dz; the complementary fraction makes 
a demand costing v1• If the defendant is indifferent between sett ling a t  
a c o s t  o f  dz and taking the plaintiff of  unknown type to t rial, then: 
dz = 
1 zP1 ( 1T 
n 1, zP1 + 1(1
where nl, ZE [O ,  1]. 
This implies 
1T l,Z  
) ( 1 ( 1 - pl) ) 
- P1) 
vl + n 1, zP1 + 1 ( 1  - P1) 
vz 
(�)(vz � dz) !: 1. 
pl dz V 1 
I f  d2 is the common demand in a semi-pooling equilibrium, it mu s t  sa tisf�· 
two r es t r ic tions: i. dz mus t  result in n1 ze ( O, 1) where n1 z is given. . 
by t he foregoing formula; and ii. dz must be at least weakly preferred to 
trial by t he severely-inj ured plaintif f . That is, 
i. v2 >dz > plVl + PzVz 
and ii. dz -
1 
?. g ( W2) .  
Since v2 > p1v1 + PzV2 and VZ > g
-1 (WZ)' there will always exis t a con tinuum
o f  s emi-pooling equilibria . Equilibria with lower dz val ues must have
higher rrl , Z  values. To summarize our conclusions , we d epic t equilibrium 
s trategies (a, F
1
, F2) wh ich support the semi-pooling equilibrium
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assoc iated with a particular d2 in the three panel s of Figure 3.
[ Figure 3 goes her e . ]  
-1 I f  g (W2) > p1v1 + p2v2 , then no pool ing equ il ibr ia exist and the
semi-pool ing equ il ibrium with the lowest common d emand has d2 = g
-1cw2) .
-1 I f ,  however , g CW2) < p1V1 + p2 v2 , then poo l ing equilibria do exist. 
As d2 is reduced below v2 , the region o f  semi-poo l ing equ i l ibria is
traversed . The lower is d2 , the higher is n1 , 2 . When d2 = p1v1 + p2V2 , n1 , 2
and we enter the region  o f  pure poo l ing . Throughout this region 
-1 (g (W2 ) S d2 S p1v1 + p2 v2 ) ,  d2 is low enough that any common demand is
acceptabl e  to the defendant but d2 is not so low that the severely-injured
plaintiff  woul d  prefer tr ial to settlement .  In a pure poo l ing equ i librium 
both plaintiffs  demand d2 and--although the defendant cannot l earn anything
since both plaintiff s  always make the common demand--nevertheless the 
defendant d etermines that the expected cost of trial (computed using pr ior 
probabil ities , p i) exceeds the cost of settling (d2) .  Consequently , he
always settl e s .  
We f irst characterize the strategy o f  the defendants which supports a 
pure-pool ing equ i l ibr ium . 
Let 
a(d) ;:; 0 for all d, with equality at d 
a( d) 1 for d $ d2 , and
g(d2) - w2 a(d) < g(d) _ W2
for d > d2 .
v2
By assumption,  a(d) = 0 for d >  v2 .




Note that given this strategy for defendants, both type of plaintiff s  
would str ictly prefer a demand o f  d2 to any other real-valued demand .
Mor eove r ,  s ince d2 S p1v1 + p2v2 the defendant would prefer to accept all
such demands . To summarize this d iscus s ion, we depict the equil ibrium 
strateg ies which support the pure pool ing equilibrium associated with a 
particular d2 in the three panels o f  Figure 4.
[Figure 4 goes here . ]  
As we have indicated , a region of  semi-pooling equilibr ia always exists 
and a reg ion of pure pooling  equ i l ibria may also exist.  One other equilibriun 
al so always exists--the separating equilibrium. It can be viewed as a 
l imiting case of the semi-pool ing equi librium in which d2 = v2 .
The following strategy for the defendants will support the separating 
equilibrium: 
a(d) > 0 for all d 
a(d) = 1 for d :::_ vl
a(d) :::_ a1(d ) with equality i f f  d
-1 a(d )  = 0 for d � g (W2)
v1 and
Given this strategy for defendants , a slightly-inj ured plaintiff will 
strictly prefer to demand v1 and a severely- inj ured plaintif f will be
-1 indifferent among demands at least as great as g (W2) .  Hence , the
severely-inj ured p laintiff cannot improve upon a demand of v2 . I f
sl ightly-inj ured plaintiffs always demand v1 and severely-inj u red plain-
tif f s  always demand v2 , the defendant can do no better than to accept all
the low demand s  and rej ect all the h igh demands . To summarize this dis-
cussion , we depict the equilibr ium strateg.ies which support the separating 
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equilibrium in the three panels of Figure 5 .  
[ Figure 5 goes here . ] 
The model we have been d i scu ssing has a separat ing e qu ilibr ium, 
a continuum of semi-pooling equilibria, and may also have a con tinuum of 
pooling equilibr ia--each supported by undominated strateg ies .-�/ I t  is 
natural to ask if any of these can be eliminated by the impo s ition of the 
reasonable, add itional restriction that the support ing s trateg ies be 
rational (" cred ible" ) --even in cont ingencies which occur with zero pro-
bab ility in equilibrium. In our model, the defendant's strategy descr ibes 
how he will react to � real-valued demand even though at mos t  two demands 
occur in equilibrium with pos itive probab ility . What would be a self-
interested response for the defendant if he were confronted by some other 
demand? Kreps and W ilson would requ ire that the defendant ' s  conj ectures 
about the plaintiff's type be made explicit and subj ected to certa in 
10/ 
re striction s .- Selten has proposed stronger restr ict ions which can be 
adapted for games where the sets of pure strategies are not f in ite . l.!./ Both 
cr iteria are d i scussed in Cave [1984J , who shows that ne ither re strict ion 
suffices to eliminate � of our equilibria . 
It might also be thought that increas ing the number of plaintiff-types 
would eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria.  However , a cont inuum of 
equ ilib r ia exists for any f in ite number of plaintiff-types a s  well as for 
. f h 
12/ a continuum o sue type s .� 
In concluding the section, therefore, it seems appropr iate to note the 
source of this indeterminacy . In the pure pooling and semi-pooling equi­
-1 l ibria , d2 mus t  be le ss than v2 and greater than g (W2 ) .  That is, d2 mu s t  
l ie i n  the comple te- information bargain ing range for a game aga in st a 
severely- inj ured pla intiff. I t  is the lack of other restr ict ion s on d2 
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which causes the continuum of equ ilibria. 
What makes this indeterminacy striking is that settlement games where 
the first mover makes a take-it-or-leave- i t  demand have a unique equilib r ium 
1 3/ when played under d ifferent information structures .� For example, under 
complete information a plaintiff of type i would know that the defendant 
knows his  identity and that the defendant would accept any demand up to Vi 
and no demand beyond it.  No other a(d) function would be cost-minim i z ing 
for the defendant.  Given thi s  a(d) function, the plaintiff would demand 
Vi with probability one .  Although no o ther demand would be made with 
pos i t ive probab ility , nonetheless the defendant would have to conjecture 
that any other demand encountered was made by the type-i plain tiff; hence 
he would accept lower and rej ect h igher demands . S ince the strategy of the 
defendant leads to plaintiff behavior which--when coupled with the defen­
dant ' s  conj ectures--in turn rationalizes the strategy of the defendant ,  it 
supports a Nash equ ilibrium. S ince only one strategy has this property, 
the e qu ilibrium is un ique . In our case , however, there exist many acceptance 
strategies for the defendant (a(d) ) which are rat ional given the pla int iff 
behavior (and conj ectures about it) which they induce . 
IV. Effects of Changing Legal Rules 
To predict the consequences of a change in legal rules, we need to be 
able to forecast how legal adve rsar ies will adapt to the new envi ronment 
in which they find themselves . The difficulty of this task should not be 
underes timated. But failure to accomplish it will result in unreal istic 
expectations about the consequences of legal reforms. Brazil [1978 ] ,  
fo r example, contra sts what was expected from the discovery rules first 
in troduced in 1938 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the i r actual 
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effects .  He argues that designers of the rules failed to take account of 
how legal adversaries would adapt their tactics to take advantage of [his 
word is "abuse"] the new rules . 
The model described above can be used to forecast the consequences 
of changes in legal rules and court policies . The predicted changes in 
behavior rules are based on the p lausible assumption that the players will 
adapt their strategies in whatever way best serves their self-interest in 
the new environment. To illustrate how the policy analysis can be conduc ted, 
we wil l  examine the consequences of a hypothe tical change in the legal 
environment--the imposition of  a fee imposed on suits of less than some 
specified amount .  We wil l  show how this legal reform would affect  the 
equilibrium behavior of p laintiffs  and defendant s  and consequent ly how 
it would affect the frequency of litigation . 
The methodology employed in this section is comparative statics . 
That is, we investigate how the e quilibria induced by one vector of 
exogenous parameters compare to the equilibria induced by a dif ferent 
vector of such parameters. S ince each vector of exogenous parameters 
induce s a� of equilibria parameterized by  dz , we must compare two sets 
of equilibria . To facilitate this comparison , we summarize the results  of 
the last sect ion in the two panels of Figure 6 .  e Panel  a p lots TTl , Z( dz) ,
the probability t hat  a slight ly-inj ured plaintiff  will inf late his demand 
in the equilibrium associated with each dz ( a s  dz varies) . Analytica l ly , 




-1 For dzc[g (WZ) ' plVl + PzVz).
h 1 . 14/t e poo ing region.� 
= 
(�\(Vz = dz ) 
P1 l dz v1 for dz
c[p1V1 + p2V2 , Vz) ,
t he semi-pooling region 
0 for d2 v2, the separating region .
ePanel b plot s a ( d2) ,  t he probability that the high demand is accepted
in the eguilibrium associated with each dz· Analytically, a
e(dz) is
defined as follows : 
ae ( d2) 1 [ g ( Vl) 
£ g ( plVl + 
- wl
Pzv;-5 - w1
g(Vl) - Wl 
g ( dz ) - wz
0 
.j
-1 for d2 c [g ( W2) , p1V1+ pz Vz )
For d2 = p1v1 + PzVz , t he boundary
between the pooling and separating 
regions 
for dzc ( p1v1 + PzVz , Vz)
for dz vz . 
In our comparative-static exercises we will show how each o f  these functions 
( the curves in Figure 6) shifts in response to the imposition of the filing 
fee . 
[Figure 6 goes here . ] 
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Our result s can be interpreted as showing how the behavior of t he defen-
dant s and plain t i f f s  would change in response to the imposit ion of  t he 
filing fee if d2 did n ot change ( or ,  more generally, if it changed in any 
specified way) . Since d2 can be observed, t he predictions of t he model 
are t e stable. 
Suppose that in a state court sys tem, cases where t he plaintif f demand s 
less t han some minimal amount ( denoted df) must be filed in a lower court,
( i . e . ,  a court of  limited j urisdiction ) ,  while a plaintiff demanding more 
must file his case in a higher court ( i. e. ,  a court of general jurisdiction) . 
Furthermore , let us as sume t hat v1 is below t he cut o f f, while d2 is always 
above it. That is, vl < df 
-1 
< g (W2) 2 d2. In other words, low demands must
be filed in a lower court, while high demands mus t  be filed in a higher court . 
Next, suppose t hat t he lower court judge imposes a fee ( f) which must be 
15/ paid for filing a demand below d;:- This fee must be paid whether t he case
is set tled out of  court or goes to trial. Hence t he defendant ' s  net cos t s  
are the same as t hey were previously. However, t he plaintiff now receiv e s  
g ( d) - f ( for d < df ) if a n y  such low demand is settled o u t  of court and
w 1 - f if he goes to trial. The plaintiff is as sumed to receive t he same 
payo f f s  as before in all ot her situations ( d?. df ) .
I t  is a simple mat ter t o  det ermine how legal adversaries would adapt 
their behavior g iven t his exogenous change in t he rules. The exogenous 
change does not alter the location of the boundary be tween the pooling and 
semi-pooling regions since it does not affect p 1v1 + p2v2 . Indeed, since 
the costs to the de fendant ( V1 and v2) remain unchanged , the curve rr1 ; ( d 2 ) 
' 
in Figure 6a does not shi f t . Finally, since d efendan ts always accept d2 
demands in the pooling region and always rej ect them in the separating 
region, ae (d2 ) will not shift in either of these two regions.
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In the semi-pooling region, however, the equilibrium b ehavior of
e defendan t s  ( a  ( d2) )  mus t  change in response to the altered c o st -incentives 
of t he plaintiffs. To determine t he new behavior of  defendant s, we must 
re-derive a(d)  in t he new policy regime . 
In t he presence of a filing fee, a slightly-injured plaintiff will be 
indifferent between a demand costing v1 and any higher demand d if and 
only if t he new acceptance function al ( d) satisfies the followin g : 
g (V1 ) - f &1 (d)  [g(d)  f] + ( 1 - a1 (d) ) [ W1 - f) f or d < df 
g (v1) - f = al( d) [ g ( d ) ] + (1 - al (d) ) wl for d � df 
A severely-injured plain tif f  will be indif ferent between d 2 and higher 
demands if and only if t he new acceptance funct ion nz( d )  satisfies t he 
following :  
�
l(d2) g ( d2) + ( 1 - al ( d2) ) w2 a2 (d) g(d)  + ( 1 - �2 ( d )) w2 
for d ?. d 2 • 
Solving for a1 (d)  and a2 ( d) ,  we ob tain : 
and &2 ( d) 
g ( d )  - w1 
&l (d)
lg ( V1) - W1 
g(V 1) - w1 - f 
g ( d) - w 1 
( g ( d 2) - w2 ) 
&1 <d 2) g ( d) - -w;-- .
Define a ( d) as follows : 
for d < df 
for d <: df 
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&(d) ? O for all d ,  with equality at d = VZ
&(d) = 1 for d < v1 , and 
&(<l) �min ( al (d) , a2(d) ) with equality i f f  d = vl or d =dz .
By assumption , a (d) = 0 for d > Vz . 
�fd) , az ( d ) , and a( d )  are depicted in Figure 7. The a(d) function supports a
[ Figure 7 goes here . ]  
semi-pooling equilibrium i n  the presence o f  a fee o n  claims filed i n  lower 
court since a slightly-injured p laintiff is indifferent between v1 and dz
and strictly pre fers either of these demands to any other while  a severely-
inj ured plaintiff strictly prefers dz to any other real-valued demand .  
e g(Vl) - w l - fIn terms of panel b in Figure 6, a ( dz ) shifts downward to  ( ) g dz - wz
everywhere in the semi-pooling region . We illustrate how the behavior of 
defendants changes ( across the set of equil ibria) in Figure 8. 
[ Figure 8 goes here . ]
Since ae( dz ) < a
e (dz) throughout the semi -pooling region , we conclude that
as long as there was previously any l itigation imposition o f  a fee on claims 
fil ed in lower court will increase the fraction of claims in higher court 
which go to trial . 
The following argument explains the intuition behind this concl usion . 
Suppose in some semi-pooling equi l ibrium that the odds of having a high 
claim chall enged did not increase . Then , every slightly-inj ured p laintiff 
previously indifferent as to the court in which to file  would inflate his 
claim and would file in the higher court . This , of course , would not be 
an equi l ibrium b ecause defendants would then want to increase their chal-
l enges to such claims . In equi l ibrium ,  the fraction of high demands which 
defendants chal lenge must inc rease by exactly enough that sl ightly-injured 
plaintiffs do not wish to inf late the ir claims any more than they d id previously . 
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As a result, in equilibrium, the increase in the f iling fee has no effect 
whatsoever on the fraction of the cases f iled in the lower court or their 
d isposit ion . 
Note that the entire impact of the increase in the filing fee of the 
lower court spills over to the h igher court. Our analysis suggests that 
when a lower court attempts to rid itself of minor cases ( d  < df) by
increasing its filing fee ,  it may cause a higher proport ion of cases in 
the h igher court to be contested and taken to trial ,  thereby causing the 
h igher court to suffer from a greater workload . 
V . Extension of the Model to n Levels of Inj ury 
Although space does not permit a complete dicussion of the generaliza-
tion to n levels of inj ury (si , i 1 , . . .  , n) , it seems important at least
to indicate that the analysis and conclusions of the 2-type case can be 
easi ly extended.  In what follows , we establish that in  the n-type case , 
separating and semi-pooling equilibria always exist and pure pooling 
equi libria might or might not exist . f.loreover , we show that our conclu-
sion about the effect of the fi ling fee on a semi-pooling equilibrium 
carries over to the n-type case . 
Let Vi denote the cost to the defendant of going to trial against a
plaintiff with a type-i inj ury . Let Wi denote the net payment such a
plainti ff expects from trial . Let di ( i  = 1, . . . , n) be n demand leve ls
arrayed in increasing order (d 1 < d2 < d3 < • • •  < dn) . Then w e  can con-
struct a semi-pooling equilibrium as fol lows . Provisionally set di = Vi 
for i = �, . . •  , n .  Suppose the least se ri ous ly-inj ured plainti f f  (s 1) 
demands eithe r d1 or d2, the next type (s2) de mands either  ct2 or ct3, ... 
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and t he most ser iously inj ured ( sn) always demand s  dn . This pat tern of
set t lement demands is  dep icted in Figure 9 and is t he coun t erpart t o  panel b 
of Figure 1 . 
[ Figure 9 goes here . ]
Next we mus t  f ind an a ( d) funct ion characterizing the defendant ' s  
behav ior wh i ch induces each type of plain t i f f  t o  behave in the way we have 
dep i cted.  Generaliz ing our p revious approach , def ine a 1 ( d )  as the locus of  
a - d combinations which makes a type-i plain t i f f  ind i f f e rent be tween a 
demand of di accepted w i t h  probabi lity  a i_ 1 ( d i ) and a demand of d accepted
with probab i l i t y  ai (d) . Then 
a i (d) must so lve the following recursive
equat ion : 
a .  1 ( d . ) g (d . )  + ( 1 - a .  1 ( d . )) w . ; a . ( d) g (d)  + ( 1 - a . ( d) ) w . 1- 1 1 1- 1 1 1 1 1
;> a .  ( d) 1 a i-1 ( d i ) 
\ g ( di ) - wi l 
g ( d )  - wi I for i ; 1 , . . . • n .  
S e t t ing a0(d1)  ; 1 , we can construct the sequence of  fun c t ions { ai (d) } 
recurs ive ly . They are port rayed in Figure 1 0 ,  t he coun terpart t o  Figure 2 . 
[ Figure 10 goes here . ] 
An a (d) func t i on whi ch makes the type-n ( i . e . , mos t  severely-inj ured) plain t i f f  
st r i c t ly pre fer d and the i th type ( i ; 1 ,  . . . n - 1 ) s t r i ctly prefer e i ther n 
di or di+l to any other real-valued demand is ea s i ly const ructed : 
a ( d )  > 0 for all d ,  w i th equality at d ; Vn 
a(d)  1 for d s_ vl and
a ( d) � min ( a
1
( d ) , a2 ( d ) , • . . . . .  an ( d ) )  w i th equa l i t y  i f f  d d i ' 
i = 1 , . . .  , n .  
We assume that a ( d) 
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0 for d > V • n 
a (d) is also dep icted in Figure 10 . 
Finally , in a semi-pooling equilibr i um the re lat ive p roport ions of the 
i th and i + 1s t  type at pool di+l ( for i ;  1 , . . •  , n - 1) mus t  leave the
Bayesian defendant indif ferent between s e t t l ing and going to t r ial . For 
the defendant to be i ndifferent , the following equa l i ty mu s t  hold : 
di+l P r (s i l ct i+l) V i
+ Pr (s i+1 l d i+l) Vi+l 
. 
Let pi denote the proport ion of type-i p laint i f f s  in the populat ion and 
let  TI ,  . be the p robab i l i ty in equilibrium that a type- i p la i n t i f f  makes a 1 , J 
d .  demand . Then , from Bayes '  theorem , 
J 
or 
S ince Ti i , i 
di+l
n .  1 , i+l 
Ti i , i+lPiVi + Ti i+l , i+lpi+lVi+l 
Ti i , i+lpi + Ti i+l , i+lpi+l
p i+l 
r 1 
( vi+l - di+l) TI . +l ' +l d - V • 1 ' 1 i+l i 
1 - TI . .  1 we conclude that1 , 1+ 
TI •  • 1 , 1  
Pi+l ( vi+l - di+l) . 1 - �
p
� TI , +l · +l d _ V for 1 i 1 ' 1 i+l i 
1 , . . .  , n - 1 . 
I f  di ; Vi for i ;  2 ,  . . .  n ,  then Ti i , i ; 1 . I f  d i is set a l i t t le smal1:_P2: ,  
however , TI ,  . E ( O ,  1) .  The re sult is one of a con t inuum of seni-poo l ing 1 , 1  
equil ibria for  the n-type case . 
Cons ider the effect  that a f i ling fee on demands be low d f would have 
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on this semi-pooling equilibrium. As before , we compare the original 
equilibrium with the corresponding new equilibrium having the same { di }
leve l s .  Given the preceding formula , it  i s  clear that once again the fee 
would not a f fect the equi librium frequencies ( 11  . .  ) with which plaintiffs  1 , J  
of each type inflate their  claims . But for plaintiff  behavior not to  
change , defendants mus t become more lit igious . Indeed , an interesting 
sort of chain-reac t ion must be set o f f .  
Suppose the fee i s  charged f o r  demands o f  less than df and
dfE ( dk , dk+l) .  The type-k plain t i f f  reasons that , CPteris paribus , 
he can avoid the filing fee by always demanding dk+l and never demanding
dk . To res tore his indiffe rence , claims of dk+l must be rej ected more
frequently . But this increase in court challenges gives the k + 1s t
type o f  p laint i f f  an incent ive always t o  inflate his claims by demanding 
dk+2 • To restore his indifference , claims of dk+2 must be rej ected more
frequen t ly . . .  Clearly , litigat ion mus t  increase at every demand level 
above dk .
Separat ing equilibria also exis t  in the n-type case as they do in the 
2- type cas e .  To construct one , suppose p lainti f f s  of the lowe s t  inj ury 
type demand v 1 and always get i t  while  pla inti f f s  of  other types each
demand V i ( i  = 2 ,  n)  and never get i t . In this equilibrium the defendant
rej e c t s  all demands exceeding min ( g- 1 Cw2 ) , 
-1  g (Wn) ) .
A .P£_o ling equilibrium exis t s  in the n-type case if and only i f  
n 
\ ( - 1 - 1  - 1 ) . � 1 p . V . > max g (W ) g (W2) , . . . .  g (W ) .1= 1 1 1 • n I f  this inequality holds , then 
pooling at any common demand be tween t he value of the left and r ight-hand 
sides would constitute a pure pooling equil ibrium. The Bayesian defendant 
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would prefer set t lement at that level to trial . Each type of plaintiff  
would prefer sett lement at that level to trial.  Therefore , i t  merely 
remains to f ind an a(d) function which would induce each plaintiff  to  
prefer  that common demand to  any other real-valued demand . We p roceed 
as we did in the 2-type case . Le t ct* be the couunon demand leve l .  De f ine 
and 
a ( d) � U for all d , wi th equality at d = Vn
a (d)  1 for d .::: d* 
g ( d*) - wna(d )  < g (d)  - Wn
for d > ct* . 
· By assump tion , a (d) = 0 for d > Vn . By arguments now familiar , this a (d)
funct i on will induce each type of plaintiff  s trictly to prefer d *  to any
other real-valued demand .
The purpose of this sec tion has been to show how the analysis and 
result s  of the 2-type case general ize . I t  should be noted , however , that 
other types of equilibria are also possible in the n-type case which have 
no counterpart in the 2-type case . Space limitat ions p revent a charac-
terizati on of these other equilibria here . 
VI .  Conclusion 
Th is paper has studied a model of pretrial settlement negotiations in 
which the prospective plaintiff  makes a real-valued settlement demand of 
his  choosing on a take-it-or-leave-it  bas i s .  Under complete informat ion , 
the equ il ibrium of this game is known to be unique but never involves any 
l it igat ion . In the more realistic cases of incomplete information , l iti-
gat ion does  occur some fract ion of the t ime even though there do in  fact  
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exist p re-trial s e t t lements wh ich both part ies would prefer to t r ial . I f  
the p l a in t i f f  i s  uninformed , the defendant learns noth ing f rom h i s  demand . 
Bebchuk ( 1 983) has s tudied this case and has shown under weak assump t ions 
that its equ i l ib r ium i s  unique . We have s tud ied the al terna t ive case in 
which the p la in t i f f  is the informed p layer . Thi s  is more p laus ible in 
personal i njury cases . In such a case , defendant learning occurs in the 
equil ibrium. However ,  the equ i l i b r ium ceases to be unique . The mul t ip l i-
c ity of equ i l ib r i a  cannot be el iminated by the usual ref inements of the 
Nash solut ion concept or  by assuming that the injured plain t if f  i s  drawn 
from one of a f in i te number or a cont inuum of possible types . A cont inuum 
of equil ibria e x i s t s  because the defendant ' s  recept ion of demands wh ich no 
plaintiff  should make with p o s i t ive p robab i l ity is indeterminate . 
Extend ing the model to the c ase where a s ingle defendant--an 
insurance company-- faces a sequence of p l a in t i f f s  of unknown type instead 
of facing only one p la in t i f f  wou ld be intere s t ing . I f  p l a in t i f f s  were 
uncertain about some a spect of  the insurance company and if the company ' s  
p revious sett lement b ehavior were observabl e ,  a " so f t" company might then 
f ind it opt imal to  build a " repu tat ion for toughness" by l it igat ing 
f requently in ear ly round s .  Such mul t i-s tage analysis seems hopelessly 
intractab l e ,  however , in this case because o f  the mu l t ip l ic ity of  the 
equ ilibria of  each s tage game . .!§./
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FOOTNOTES 
*This paper extends the analysis in Salant and Rest ( 1982 ) by relaxing
its  restrict ion that plaint iffs must make one of two exogenous sett le-
men t demands.  I would l ike to thank Gregory Rest for  his collaborat ion
in t he earl ier research e f fort . I would also like t o  express my deepest
grat itude to Jonathan Cave for his many helpful suggestions .
l:_/ We use the Lebesgue-S t ieltjes  notat ion C f  8g ( x) dF(x) ) here t o  mean e ither
the sum � g(x) f ( x) or t he integral /Bg ( x) f ( x) dx .  In what f ollows ,  thexES 
equil ibrium distribut ion funct ions ( Fi) governing t he demands of  each
plaint iff turn out to be step funct ions .  
!:_/ The economist should recogn ize this a s  a familiar idea since h e  almost 
surely invokes it to explain the determinat ion of aggregate output in 
an industry in which each firm has the same constant marginal cost 
schedule. In that case ,  aggregate output is determinat e  but the 
quantity produced by any individual firm at the equilib rium price 
is indeterminate . 
]_/ For exampl e ,  to establ ish ( b) assume that both plaint iffs  d id assign 
positive dens ity to a common interval . Then the expected payoff  of the 
severely-inj ured plaintiff  would not change if instead he focussed the 
same probability mass on any low demand in t he interval accepted with posi-
t ive probability .  Sim�larly t he payoff  of the sl ight ly- inj ured plaint iff 
would no t change if instead the probab ility mass he ass igned to the 
entire interval were divided between the same low demand in the 
interval and some higher demand in the interval . But it  is t hen 
obvious ( from Propo sition 3) that the severely- inj ure� pla in t i f f  could 
increase his expected payo ff  by pu tting all the probab ility mass he 
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ass igned to the interval on the higher demand . S ince the original 
s tra tegy of the severely- inj ured plaint iff  was no t o p t imal , it  would 
not occur in an equil ibrium . 
To es tablish ( c) , assume t ha t  t he slightly-injured plaint iff  d id 
a s s ign pos i t ive density to some interval and tha t  the severely- inj ured 
plaint i f f  d id ass ign positive probabil ity to any po int in that interval 
other than its upper boundary . Then the expected payo f f  of the sli ghtly-
injured plaintiff  would no t change i f  the same probabil ity mass  were 
ins tead allocated to two po ints--the demand also made by the severely-
inj ured pla intiff  and some h igher demand in t he interval accepted with 
posi t ive probability . But i t  is t hen obvious ( from Propo s i t ion 3) that 
the severely- injured plaintiff  could increase his expected payof f  by 
put t ing all  the probability  assigned to the interval on the h igher 
demand . S ince the original strategy o f  the severely-injured plain t i f f  
was no t opt imal ,  it  would n o t  occur in an equil ibr ium. To establ ish t he 
o t her part of ( c ) , use same argument but reverse the roles o f  the two 
types o f  plaint iffs . 
4 /  In part icular , i f  the s l ightly- inj ured plaint iff  at least weakly prefers 
the higher of  two demands , t he severely-injured plaint i f f  must strict ly 
prefer t he higher demand .  
2_/ Use i s  made here of  the s impl if icat ion t hat the defendant is  constra in ted 
to rej ect  all demands exceeding v2 . I f  instead the defendant were 
modeled as free to accept such h igh demands ,  a more int r icate  " properness" 






I f  t he demand in t he interval ( g-1 (w2) ,  v2) was not accepted with
posit ive probability , then no slightly-injured plaint i f f  would ever 
make it . But s ince in cases d and e , such plaint iffs  are assumed 
to make the demand in this  interval somet ime s ,  t hat demand must be 
accepted with posit ive probabi l it y .  But g iven t h i s  fact , we can 
infer t hat the v2 demand mus t  also be accepted with pos i t ive pro­
babil ity.  Suppose the contrary . Then , every severely-inj ured 
p lain t i f f  would st rictl y  prefer to pool with t he s l ightly-inj ured 
p lain t i f f  at the lower demand since he prefers set tlement at t hat 
level to trial and there is some chance of set t lement . But this  
contradicts the assumpt ion underlying cases d and e that t he 
severely-inj ured plaint i f f  demands v2 some t imes . Theref ore , v2
must be accepted with posit ive probability.  
Verificat ion of i.  and iii.  are s traightforward . To verify i i . , note 
that 
where 
a ( d) [ g ( d) - Wz ]1 
= k 
a ( d) g ( d) - wl2 
[ g( V ) - W1 l 1 k = g ( d�) - w2 al (dz)
g ( d) - w2 a1 (d) S ince g ( d) _ Wl increases in d ,  a2 ( d) must increase in d .
The restrict ions on a (d) are insuf f icient to determine a(d) un ique l y .  
But  since every candidate sat isfying the restrict ions would ass ign 
the same respective acceptance probabilit ies as a(d)  t o  the two 
demands (d = v1 and d = a2) which plaintiffs  make with posit ive
J_/ 
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probabil ity , t his indeterminacy is of no con sequenc e .  
T o  verify that a n  equilibrium is supported by  undominated strateg ies , 
we must show t hat there exists no strategy for any player that is at 
least as good for  that player as his equilibrium strategy aga inst all  
feasible combinations of  st rategies for the other players .  Hence , t o  
show that a proposed strategy does n o t  dominate the equilibrium 
st rategy of some player , we only need t o  f ind one feasible combina­
t ion of st rategies for t he other players which would make the proposed 
st rategy inferior.  Consider f irst the semi-pooling  equilibr ium. 
S ince the severely-inj ured plaint iff  strictly p refers d2 t o  any other
real-valued demand--given a( d) --F (d) cannot be dominated . S ince the 2 
slightly- inj ured plaint i f f  strictly prefers d2 or v1 t o  any other
real-valued demand--given a ( d) --the only possib ility for weekly dom-
inat ing the equilibrium strategy is to give alternative weights to 
d2 and v1 . But i f  the proposed alternative were to give more weight
to v1 (resp . d 2 ) ,  it would be inferior to F1 (d )  against an acceptance
strategy of  the de fendant ( some a(d ) ) which makes the slightly-
inj ured plaint i f f  s trictly prefer demands of  d2 ( resp . v1) to demands
of vl (resp . d2) .  Hence F1 ( d) cannot be dominated . As for the defend-
ant , we must  show that no alternat ive ( a (d ) ) weakly dominates the 
equilibrium strategy a ( d) agains t every feasible combination of  strat-
egies ( F1 , F2 ) of the plaintiffs . Suppose n ( d ' )  > a ( d ' )  ( res p .  n ( d ' )  < 
a( d ' ) )  for some d ' r (V1 , v2) .  I f  F1 ( resp . F2) j umped f rom zero to one
at d '  and F2 ( resp .  F1) j umped from zero to one at v2 ( res p .  v1) then
the proposed strategy would be strictly inferior to the defendant ' s  
equilibrium strategy since the proposed alternative would cause demands 
of d '  to be accepted more o ften ( resp . , less often) . Consider next a 
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pure pooling equilibrium . This same argument can b e  used again to 
estab l ish that a ( d) is undominated . Moreover , F1 (d)  and F2 ( d) cannot
be dominated since , in a pure poo ling equilibrium, each plaintiff  
st rictly prefers the  common demand t o  any other--given a( d ) . 
Last , con s ider the separating equil ibrium. S ince the s l ightly-
inj ured plaint iff  st rict ly p refers to demand v1--given a ( d ) --
F1 ( d) cannot be dominated . Moreover ,  s ince any alternat ive t o
F2 (d)  is inf erior f o r  the severely-inj ured plaintiff  if  demands
cost ing v2 happened always to be accepted , F2 (d) cannot be domi­
nated . Finally, the argument used above establ ishes that the 
defendant ' s  strategy ( a(d ) ) is undominated . 
10/ Consider the defendant ' s  conj ectures in a semi-pooling equilibr ium. 
Recal l that his equil ibr ium strategy is as follows : 
a ( d) 1 for d£ ( 0 ,  v1 J
a (d ) d O ,  1 )  for  dE (V l ' V 2)
a (d) 0 for d = v2 ' 
I f  this strategy is cost-min imiz ing for the defendant facing demand d ,  
then his conj ecture that he is fac ing  a slightly-inj ured plaint iff ( C( d )  
mus t sat isfy the following condi t ion s :  
d s C ( d) Vl + ( 1  - C (d) ) v z f o r  dE [ O ,  v1 J
d C (d ) V1 + ( l - C (d) ) v2 for <lr (v1 , v2 ) 
d � C(d ) Vl + ( 1  - C ( d) )v2 for d c v2 . 
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Hence C ( d) c [O ,  l ]  for dE [ O ,  v1 ]
C ( d) 
vz - d
vz - vl
E ( O ,  1) for dE ( V  l ' V z
)
C (d) E (O ,  l ]  for d Vz -
Kreps-Wilson require tha t  t hese conj ectures be consistent with the 
defendant ' s  initial beliefs ( t hat slight inj uries occur with probabil ity 
p1 ) ,  with any informat ion he may have observed ( d) or in ferred and , when­
ever possibl e ,  with the hypot hesis t hat play has evolved to this point  
under the  equilibrium strategies ( severely-inj ured plain t i f f s  always demand 
dz while sl ight ly-inj ured pla in t if f s  d emand v1 with probability  Til , Z and
dz with complimentary probability) . That is ,  for  those demands ( V1 and dz )
wh ich occur in the equil ibrium wit h posit ive probability,  t he conj ecture 
must be cons istent with Baye s '  theorem. From Baye s '  theorem, 
pl Ti l ,  z
P r ( Sl l dz) = p TI + ( 1 - pl) 1 l , Z  . 1 
c - Pl)Cz - dz
)
Recal l  that Ti l., Z = � dz - V1 
Hence P r ( S1 J dz )
vz - dz
Vz - vl
C ( dz ) .
Pl ( 1 - Ti l ,  z)Similarly Pr ( S1 I V1) = p ( 1 - TI ) + ( 1 - rl) · O 1 1 , z 1 . 
Hence we need merely restrict C (d) so that C ( V1 ) = 1 . 
Any conj ecture function of the following form would therefore be sat is-
factory : 
C (d) E [O ,  l ]  





C(d) c [O ,  l ]  
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for dE ( 0 ,  Vl)
for d = v1
for dE ( V1 , Vz)
for d vz .
Some authors have proposed requiring that the conj ecture  funct ion be 
cont inuous or monotone.  For any semi-pooling equilibrium there exis t 
C ( d) funct ions which s imultaneously sat isfy these add it ional restrict ion s .  
Hence any of  the cont inuum of  semi-pooling equilib r ia i s  sequent ia l .  
A similar demonstration could b e  made f o r  the pool ing o r  separat ing 
equilibria. 
_!!/ Underlying the defendant ' s  equilibrium strategy ( a( d) )  is his conj ect ure 
( C(d) ) that the plain t i f f  making observed demand d is sl ightly inj ured . 
Even if demand d occurs with zero probabilit y  in equilibrium, S e lten ' s  
perturbed-game approach in some cases permits the eliminat ion o f  some 
conj ectures as implausible . Although it could be used t o  rule out t he 
equilibria we have already eliminated by other means ,  S e l ten ' s  approach 
unfortunately permit s us to rat ional ize all of  t he rema ining equ ilibria . 
I magine the two types o f  plaint iffs making a subopt imal demand d very 
inf requently .  If  the  relat ive frequency of  the errors of  the two t ype s 
of plain t if f s  at each subopt imal d i s  set appropriately , t hen C (d) can 
be derived by Baye s '  theorem. As we let the two frequencies of errors 
by the two types of  plaint iffs  t end to zero while maintain ing t he i r  
rat io , we obtain i n  the limit our equi l ibrium--in which such errors 
happen with zero probability but defendants hold conj ectures C (d) . 
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For deta ils , see Cave [ 1984 ) .  
12/  That a continuum of equilibria exis ts in the f inite- type case is 
evident from the discussion in Section V . A continuum of equilibria 
may also exist in the continuous-type case . Let the types be indexed 
by iE ( O ,  1) where a higher i reflects a more serious injury . Let
P ( i ) be the dens ity  function for the continuous random variable i .  Assume 
i t  is common knowledge that p laint i f f s  are " drawn f rom" P ( i ) . Let 
V ( i )  be the cost to the defendant of going to trial against a type-i 
plaintif f .  V ( i )  is strictly increasing . Suppose , given the 
exogenous dat a ,  that the following inequality holds : 
f� V ( i )P ( i )di � g-1 (vn>) 
Then there will exist  values which lie strictly between the le ft 
and right-hand sides of the inequality . Pick  one such value and 
denote it d* . I f  every type of plainti f f  pooled at d* , then
defendants could infer nothing addi tional about the type of plain-
tiff  by observing his demand . In that case ,  the expected cost to 
the de fendant ( the lef t-hand side above ) would  exceed the cost of 
sett ling ( d*) .  Hence , defendants would strictly p re fer to set t le
* * 
at d • Moreover ,  since settling at d would be preferred to trial by  
the most  seriously-inj ured plainti f f  ( i  = I ) , it  would be  preferred 
to trial by any of  the less inj ured plaint iffs . Suppose the plaintiffs  
faced the following acceptance func tion : 
-F9-
a ( d) � 0 for all d ,  with equality at d � V ( l )  
* 
a ( d) = 1 for d < d 
* 
g ( d  ) - W(l )  * a (d)  < __ . ,  for d > d • 
Then every type of plaintiff would strictly prefer to pool at d* .
S ince a continuum of possible values exist for d* , a continuum of
pooling equilibria exist . 
�/ Bebchuk [198 3 ]  examines a legal sett lements  game wit h precisely the 
same sequence of moves but assumes t hat the f irst mover is un informed . 
Mult iple equilibria i.n such a case are except ional and can easily be 
ruled out by weak assump t ions .  
}.!!_/ 
-1 For s impli c it y ,  we assume t hat g (W2 ) < p1v1 + p2v2 so that a p ool ing
region exist s .  It is t rivial to adapt the analysis when the inequal i t y  
is  reversed and hence n o  such region exists . 
}J_/ For s implicity , assume f < g (V1) .  That is , the fee is not so large
that demands of v1 would be unprof i tabl e  for plaintiffs .
_!§_/ Ordover-Rubinstein ( 1983 )  analyze a sequential litigation game under 
incomplete information but f ix the settlements which can be reacherl 
out of court exogenously . I f  such an approach is regarded as acceptab l e ,  
it  can also be used to extend the personal injury game of  this paper to 
a mul t i-plaint iff set t ing.  For a personal injury game where the 
settlement demand is restricted exogenously and the resu l t ing equil ibrium 
is unique , see Salant-Rest ( 1982 ) . 
- Rl-
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